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I. INTRODUCTION

Upon entry into the United States in 1817, Mississippi acquired title to and sovereign trusteeship responsibilities over its coastal tidelands. 1 The issue of the geographic boundary of these public trust tidelands reached the Mississippi Supreme
Court first in 1857,2 and then re-emerged in the 1980's when the State and a private landowner separately executed oil and gas leases to the same coastal property.3 In 1988, the United States Supreme Court resolved that dispute in favor of
the State, in the process affirming the Mississippi Supreme Court's long-held position that state public trust lands encompass all lands under navigable and non-navigable tidal waters below mean high tide. 4 Proponents of public rights in coastal
waters heralded this decision, PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Mississippi,5 as finally resolving the issue and paving the way for a coherent resolution of coastal boundary
disputes. However, their celebration was short-lived as the 1989 Mississippi Legislature muddied the waters with legislation directing the Secretary of State to delineate the public/private coastal land boundary in a manner inconsistent with the
United States Supreme Court's decision6 and, arguably in contravention of article
4 section 95 of the Mississippi Constitution, which prohibits the state from donating public lands to private corporations or individuals. 7 As a result, the State is in
court once again and is in an interesting litigation posture. A private party and the

1. The state's claimed right to these lands stems from the "equal footing" doctrine which assures that states
created after original formation of the Union entered with the same legal rights and duties of the original thirteen
states. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 472-74 (1988); see Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 212, 221-23 (1845).
2. Martin v. O'Brien, 34 Miss. 21 (1857); see also State ex rel. Rice v. Stewart, 184 Miss. 202, 184 So. 44
(1938).
3. Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986), affdsub nom. Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, reh'g denied, 486 U.S. 1018 (1988).
4. PhillipsPetroleum Co., 484 U.S. at 476.
5. 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
6. Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-7 (Supp. 1989).

7. Miss. CONST. art. 4, § 95.
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State of Mississippi have asked the court to direct the Secretary of State to follow
the legislature's mandate. 8 The Secretary of State has taken the position that to do
so is both unconstitutional and inconsistent with the United States Supreme
Court's ruling.9 Thus, the State of Mississippi is in an adversarial position with
itself.
The first court opinion (issued by the Chancery Court of Harrison County) upheld the 1989 tidelands legislation. 1" The expected appeal has been filed. Thus,
for the second time in three years, the Mississippi Supreme Court has before it an
issue of critical importance to the evolution of Mississippi public trust law. Its decision will test the scope of the state's authority under the constitution to alienate
public lands to the private sector at no charge. And the case carries important political ramifications as well.
This article delineates the issues at stake in the current controversy and suggests
a desirable outcome from both legal and policy viewpoints. After a brief discussion of the PhillipsPetroleum Co. decision, the article examines the political response that led to the current controversy and presents the main arguments of the
litigators. It then analyzes the most important legal issues and recommends a resolution that would overturn the tidelands legislation.
II. PUBLIC TRUST LAW IN MISSISSIPPI
In PhillipsPetroeum Co., the United States Supreme Court affirmed a Mississippi Supreme Court decision establishing the high water mark as the inland
boundary of state coastal public trust tidelands. " The dispute had its genesis in
passage of the Coastal Wetlands Protection Act12 which charged the Mississippi
Marine Resources Council (later reorganized into the Bureau of Marine Resources) with, among other things, preparing maps identifying state-owned
coastal wetlands. Based on the boundaries established by these maps, Mississippi's Mineral Lease Commission leased oil and gas rights in 600 acres of tidelands
to Saga Petroleum U.S. Inc., although record title already belonged to Cinque
Bambini Partnership and Phillips Petroleum Company. 4 The property in question
was part of a larger tract that was settled in the late 18th century and since used by
a succession of landowners.'" It consisted of largely undeveloped marsh, lake, and

8. See Brief of Plaintiff, William D. Byrd, Byrd v. State, No. 17,789 (Ch. Ct. of Harrison County, Miss.);
Brief of Defendant, State of Mississippi, Byrd v. State, No. 17,789 (Ch. Ct. of Harrison County, Miss.). On
appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court, No. 90TS692. Copies are on file with the Mississippi College Law
Review.
9. See Brief of Counter-Plaintiff, Secretary of State of Mississippi, Byrd v. State, No. 17,879 (Ch. Ct. of
Harrison County, Miss.). On appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court, No. 90TS692. Copy is on file with the
Mississippi College Law Review.
10. Byrd v. State, No. 17,879, slip op. (Ch. Ct. of Harrison County, Miss. Apr. 18, 1990).
11.Phillips Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. at 469.
12. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 49-27-1 to -69 (Supp. 1989).
13. Cinque Bambini Partnership,491 So. 2d at 511.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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tributary streams within the Jourdan River drainage area.18 Located several miles
from the Gulf Coast and primarily non-navigable, the land was nevertheless subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.17 Titleholders of record had paid property
taxes for approximately 150 years.18 No one questioned the private ownership until the state issued leases in 1977.19

Following the State's action, Cinque Bambini and Phillips Petroleum filed suit
to remove clouds from their titles.2" The Chancery Court ruled that, under the
public trust doctrine, the state owned approximately 140 acres.21 On appeal to the
Mississippi Supreme Court, Cinque Bambini argued that the public trust property
boundaries were legally redefined in a series of cases beginning with Martin v.
Lessee of Waddell22 to include only those waters navigable in fact in 1817, making
tidal influence irrelevant.23 Consequently, because the contested property was
never used for commercial navigation or even capable of such use, it should not be
included within the state's public trust. The State counterargued that the cases
cited by Cinque Bambini did not restrict the "ebb and flow" test in tidal areas, but
actually expanded the trust to include both tidelands and inland navigable waters. 24
After finding that federal rather than state law controlled the question of what
lands were given to the state in trust upon its entrance to the Union, the Mississippi
Supreme Court rejected Cinque Bambini's navigable-in-fact theory.2" It offered a
more illustrative explanation of the ebb and flow test by describing it in terms of a
sail hoisted upon a toothpick.26 As long as a tiny object like a toothpick is capable
of floating continuously at mean high tide from a navigable body of water to a
point inland, the waters traversed and the lands beneath are within the boundaries
of the public trust.27
Finally, after deciding that state law controlled the ownership of tidal areas created subsequent to statehood, the court excluded from the public trust two lakes
within the Cinque Bambini holdings that were artificially created as a result of
highway dredging operations." The public trust tidal area finally awarded to the

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Cinque Bambini Partnership Co. v. Mississippi, No. 14,178, slip op. (Ch. Ct. of Hancock County, Miss.
Apr. 28, 1982).
21. Id. In his opinion, the Honorable William L. Stewart stated:
The Public Trust Doctrine in Mississippi has always held that the State of Mississippi is the absolute
owner of the soil and of the minerals therein contained and in the beds of all its shores, arms and inlets of
the sea wherever the tide ebbs and flows, as Trustee for the people of the State; and, as Trustee, cannot
convey the title to the land beneath such waters below the mean high water mark in fee simple.
Id. at 32.
22.41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
23. Cinque Bambini Partnership, 491 So. 2d at 513.
24. Id. at 513-14.
25. Id. at 514.
26. Id. at 515.
27. Id. at 516.
28.Id. at 520.
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State amounted to forty-two acres underlying the north branch of Bayou LaCroix
and eleven small drainage streams.29
In affirming the Mississippi Supreme Court's decision, the United States Supreme Court held that states, upon entry to the Union, received all lands subject to
the ebb and flow of the tides regardless of actual navigability."0 The Court foresaw
difficulties in delineating the boundaries of public tidelands if Phillips Petroleum's
navigable-in-fact theory was adopted." It assented to Mississippi's claim that the
ebb and flow rule has the benefit of uniformity and ease of application and was
unpersuaded by alternative delineating methods offered by Phillips.32 It rejected
Phillips Petroleum's argument that the decision would be "inequitable" by upsetting property expectations and interests of coastal landowners who have paid taxes
on their lands for over a century. 33 Because cases that have addressed Mississippi's public trust interests in the past had described uses of them not relating to navigability (such as bathing, swimming, recreation, fishing, and mineral
development), the Court found that those owning property in tidal areas should
reasonably have known that the State's claims were not limited to lands under navigable waterways."

III. MISSISSIPPI'S

RESPONSE

A. Commission on Public Trust Tidelands
On June 23, 1988, in response to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Phillips, Mississippi's Secretary of State Dick Molpus 31 established a Blue Ribbon
Commission on Public Trust Tidelands to guide the state in its efforts to produce a
sound and equitable tidelands leasing program .3 The Commission consisted of
twenty-six specially-appointed members from a variety of backgrounds and occupations. 3 Representatives from a number of state agencies were called upon to
serve as technical support staff and to answer questions from Commission members and the general public.8 In addition, an administrative staff of four, headed
'

29.Id. at 510.
30. PhillipsPetroleum Co., 484 U.S. at 476.
31. Id. at 480.
32. Id. at 481.
33. Id. at 481-84.
34. Id. at 482.
35. In Mississippi, the Secretary of State is charged by law with protection of public trust lands. Miss. CODE
ANN. § 7-11-]1 (Supp. 1990).
36. See Nelson, Public Trust Tidelands in Mississippi: Title Wave Hits the Gulf Coast, Proceedings of the
Eighth Annual Submerged Lands Management Conference, South Padre Island, Tex. at 5(Oct. 1-6, 1989) [hereinafter Nelson]. Copy is on filed with the Mississippi College Law Review.
37. Lawyers and elected officials seem to be disproportionately represented. A breakdown of the members'
occupations reveals the following: five lawyers; seven elected officials; five business persons; one ex-state official; one hospital administrator; two college administrators; one environmental organization representative; and
one minister. Only one member lived outside the coastal region. See generally Nelson, supra note 36, at 5. Copy
is on file with the Mississippi College Law Review.
38. Nelson, supra note 36, at 6.
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by the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Lands, was appointed to carry out
day-to-day operations and to act as public liaison."
The Secretary of State submitted a list of specific questions for the Commission's consideration, but stressed that he placed no conditions or limitations on its
work except to request that "members be fair, sensitive, and cognizant of the
sweeping ramifications of its recommendations."" Each Commission member
was assigned to serve on one of five committees - Boundaries, Littoral/Riparian
Rights, Conservation and Development, Taxation, or Lease Program Management.41
The Commission, as a whole, met eight times from June through December.2
Its various committees met separately as required.'s All meetings were open to
the public with time set aside to answer questions from the audience." To provide
an opportunity for additional input, printed comment forms were distributed
throughout courthouses, post offices, public buildings, and newspapers in the
three coastal counties.45 In August, an administrative office was established in
Gulfport to coordinate Commission activities and to serve as a clearinghouse for
the public.

Each committee was responsible for determining whether or not to address particular public trust issues within its assigned subject areas, as well as for developing procedures that would best ensure consensus." 7 Many committees requested
that members of the technical support staff and outside experts testify on specific
matters." During each Commission meeting, committee chairpersons presented
progress reports and fielded questions."
On November 18, 1988, the Commission published an interim report containing its findings and recommendations.5 0 Prior to finalizing the report, public
hearings were held on three successive evenings during late November. 1 The
Commission adopted its final recommendations on December 8, 1988.2 The

39. Id.
40. Minutes of First Meeting of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Public Trust Tidelands, at 3 (June 23, 1988).
Copy is on file with the Mississippi College Law Review.
41. See Nelson, supr note 36, at 6-7.
42. Minutes of each of these meetings can be acquired from the Mississippi Secretary of State's Coast Office,
P.O. Box 97, Gulfport, MS 39502-0097.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Interim Report, Blue Ribbon Commission on Public Trust Tidelands (adopted Oct. 25, 1988). Copy is on
file with the Mississippi College Law Review.
51. See supra note 42.
52. Draft of Final Report, Blue Ribbon Commission on Public Trust Tidelands (adopted Dec. 8, 1988). Copy
is on file with the Mississippi College Law Review.
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recommendations were presented to the Secretary of State and were adopted,
without change, in the form of administrative rules. 3
The final report contained over thirty specific recommendations. 4 A recitation of those recommendations is not necessary because most of the findings were
incorporated into subsequent public trust legislation that will be discussed below."
For purposes of this article, the most important Commission recommendations
were those directly related to the delineation of the public trust boundary. The
Commission recommended that where the shore has not been developed, the
boundary of public trust tidelands should be today's mean high tide." Where the
shore has been developed, the historical boundary should be determined using the
earliest reliable data of the type admissible in a court of law."7
B. History ofLegislation
Upon release of the Public Trust Commission's final report, the Secretary of
State aggressively sought comprehensive legislation that would track the Commission's recommendations. As trustee of Mississippi's public lands, he had a legal
authority to implement some, but not all, of the recommendations put forward by
the Commission.55 Moreover, without a clear legislative mandate, he would have
been forced to singly bear the political costs associated with carrying out the controversial tideland leasing program.
Many owners of coastal property were understandably concerned that they
would have to relinquish title to the state. Other coastal citizens and businesses
were worried that they would incur tremendous losses as divested property owners would seek recovery on warranty deeds from grantors or title insurance policies. Notwithstanding vigorous opposition by some coastal residents and
legislators, bills authorizing a comprehensive public trust leasing program were
introduced in both the House of Representatives and Senate during the 1989 legislative session." House Bill No. 92060 was sponsored by Representative Ray Vecchio, who served on the Blue Ribbon Commission on Public Trust Tidelands.

53. Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Public Trust Tidelands, presented to Secretary of State Dick
Molpus, January, 1989 (adopted as Rules and Regulations for the Administration, Control and Leasing of the
Public Trust Tidelands, January 20, 1989). Copy is on file with the Mississippi College Law Review.
54. Id.
55. A summary of the Commission's Recommendations can be found in Jarman & McLaughlin, Public Trust
in Mississipi: The Afternath of the Phillips Petroleum Decision, Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium on Coastal
and Ocean Management, Charleston, S.C., July, 1989, 2593-97. Copy is on file with the Mississippi College
Law Review.
56. Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Public Trust Tidelands at 4 (Jan. 1989).
57. Id.
58. For example, in the absence of specific legislative direction, revenues from state tideland leases would go
directly into the general fund rather than to a specially designated fund for the management and protection of
public trust tidelands. Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-27-69 (Supp. 1990). Legislation is also required to amend existing
state law which places severe constraints on the maximum terms allowed under a tideland lease. Miss. CODE
ANN. § 29-1-107 (Supp. 1990).
59. See infra notes 60-61.
60. H.R. 920, 104th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1989 Miss. (Substitute Bill).
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Senate Bill No. 278061 was sponsored by a coalition of senators representing
coastal districts.
Although each bill generally tracked the Commission's recommendations, the
two versions differed substantially. The House Bill delegated broad authority to
the Secretary of State and followed the Commission's intent quite closely.62 The
Senate Bill, in contrast, limited the Secretary's role and included several provisions contrary to the Commission's findings."
Most significantly, Senate Bill 2780 required that where coastal property is already developed, the boundary of those tidelands held in trust by the state should
be delineated as the determinable mean high water line nearest the July 1, 1973,
effective date of the Coastal Wetland Protection Law.64 This provision is clearly
contrary to the findings of the Commission which recommended that the boundary be determined by using "the earliest available reliable information of the type
admissible in a court of law."6" The Senate version would, in effect, alienate or
convey from the public trust those tidelands that were developed prior to 1973.
The Senate Substitute Bill 2780 also contained a provision that declared it to be
the law of the state that title to tidelands lawfully filled by the acts of a stranger,
without the knowledge or acquiescence of the upland owner and which is contiguous to the upland property, accrues to the benefit of the upland owner.66 If the fill
was by the state or one of its subdivisions for use as a beach or protection of a seawall, the filled property would be subject to a permanent easement by the public. 67
This legislative declaration had great practical significance because much of Mis-

61. S. 2780, 104th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1989 Miss. (Substitute Bill).
62. See H.R. 920, 104th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1989 Miss. (Substitute Bill).
63. See S. 2780, 104th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1989 Miss. (Substitute Bill).
64. Id. at § 5(l).
65. See supra note 56.
66. Supra note 61, § 5(2).
67. Id. This provision was an attempt by the Senate to resolve legal confusion in the state of Mississippi over
the ownership of property that was filled or pumped in by a stranger. In Harrison County v. Guice, 244 Miss. 95,
140 So. 2d 838 (1962), the Mississippi Supreme Court was asked to determine whether lands that were once
subject to the public trust could inure to the upland owner when artificially filled. In Guice the county filled
shallow bottoms below mean high tide, as well as upland on Guice's property, in order to protect Highway 90 and
the seawall that separated it from the Mississippi Sound. The court ruled that where tidelands are filled in or
pumped up by acts of a stranger to the upland title, the upland owner held title to these filled lands even though the
accretions were created at public expense and the submerged land that was filled to make the beach previously
belonged to the state. Guice, 244 Miss. at 107-10, 140 So. 2d at 842-43.
A federal district court decision arising from the same controversy as Guice came to the opposite conclusion.
In United States v. Harrison County, 399 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1968), the court rejected the Guice holding, reasoning instead that article 4, section 95 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 supersedes the common law doctrine
of accretion. Id. at 491. Section 95 reads: "Lands belonging to, or under the control of the state, shall never be
donated directly or indirectly to private corporations or individuals." Id. Because of this provision, the court
ruled, private upland owners cannot take ownership of formerly submerged lands. Id.
As a result of these and subsequent conflicting decisions, the status of ownership of man-made beaches on Mississippi's coast is still in doubt. A case presently on appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court may address some
of these inconsistencies. Mississippi Highway Comm'n v. Gillich, (No. 59605), involves the ownership of the
sand beach directly south of the seawall, together with what, if any, riparian rights the plaintiff might have. For a
more detailed discussion, see Jarman, Of ime, Tidelands, and Public Trust, 57 Miss. L.J. 131 (1987) and
Wetherbee, Recent Developments with Respect to Public Trust Tidelands in Mississippi, Proceedings of the Eighth
Annual Submerged Lands Management Conference, South Padre Island, Tex. (Oct. 1-6, 1989).
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sissippi's beachfront property was created as the result of seawall construction and
sand replenishment projects beginning in 1915.6"
Finally, the Senate Substitute Bill 2780 provided a detailed statement of legislative findings of fact clearly at odds with the tone and intent of the Commission's
report. 9 In a nutshell, these findings stated that the dispute and uncertainty over
title to public trust tideland property had caused an incalculable loss of dollars and
jobs to the coastal area. 7" The findings termed this situation intolerable and concluded that immediate resolution of the dispute would serve the higher public purpose.71 By declaring that the swift resolution of uncertainty over title served a
higher public purpose than protecting the state's interest in its public trust tidelands, the Senate attempted to lay a legal foundation for alienating trust lands developed prior to 1973. 72

A conference committee made up of three members from each house met behind closed doors and negotiated a compromise bill that was signed into law effective March 31, 1989." 3 The final legislation deleted some sections that were
objected to by the Secretary of State, such as the provision that awarded upland
owners title to public trust property filled by a stranger.74 However, Senate conferees refused to remove the controversial provision that requires the Secretary of
State to delineate the boundary of developed public trust tidelands nearest to July
1, 1973.7 They also rejected any attempt to change the legislative findings of fact
contained in the preamble of Senate Bill 2780.76
C. Summary of the FinalPublic Trust Tidelands Legislation
The stated purpose of the legislation is to favor the preservation of the natural
state of the public trust tidelands except where a specific alteration of the tidelands
would serve a higher purpose."7 Resolution of the uncertainty and disputes that
have arisen as to the location of the public trust boundary is declared to be in the
higher public interest.7" A preamble to the legislation states that disputes over title
to public trust tidelands have created an intolerable economic situation along the
Mississippi coast and that immediate resolution is required and would serve a

68. For a good discussion of the history of seawall construction and beach replenishment projects in Harrison
County, Mississippi, see United States v. Harrison County, 399 F2d 485, 487-88 (5th Cir. 1968).
69. See supra note 61, at§2.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. The legislative findings of fact play a significant role in the legal arguments presented in Byrd v. State, No.
17,879, slip op. (Ch. Ct. of Harrison County, Miss. Apr. 18, 1990). On appeal to the Mississippi Supreme
Court (No. 90TS692).
73. Act approved Mar. 31, 1989, ch. 495, 1989 Miss. Laws 355 (codified in Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-1 to 23. (Supp. 1989)) [hereinafter referred to as tidelands legislation].
74. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-1. The final legislation simply provides that the state recognizes the common law doctrine as it applies to such lands. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
75. See Miss. CODE § 29-15-1 to -23 (Supp. 1989).
76. See id.
77. Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-3(1) (Supp. 1989).
78. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 29-15-3(2) (Supp. 1989).
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higher public purpose.79 The legislation declares that tidelands are held in trust for
use by all of the people, but that the state also has the responsibility of protecting
the common law and statutory rights of the littoral and riparian property owners.8"
The Secretary of State, in cooperation with other state agencies, is directed to
prepare a "Preliminary Map of Public Trust Tidelands.""1 The preliminary map
will depict the public trust boundary of undeveloped tidelands as the current mean
high water line. 2 For developed shoreline, the boundary is to be "the determinable mean high water line nearest the effective date of the Coastal Wetlands Protection Act" (July 1, 1973). 83 Natural inland expansion of tide waters increases the
land subject to the trust." "[G]radual and imperceptible accumulation of land by
natural causes [accretion]

. . . [and] the increase of land by permanent with-

drawal or retrocession of tidal waters by natural causes [reliction], diminish the
land subject to the public trust ....

"85

In all other circumstances, "the state rec-

ognizes the common law doctrine as it pertains to such tidelands

.

88

"After

the preparation and publication of the certified preliminary map, . . . the [Mis-

sissippi] Bureau of Marine Resources is authorized and directed to conduct a comprehensive program of public trust tidelands mapping ....
"87
The preliminary map is to be posted at various locations within each coastal
county for public inspection.88 Following a sixty-day comment period, the Secretary of State has discretion to revise the map accordingly.89 All revisions must be
completed within twenty days of the end of the comment period, at which time the
map will be formally adopted. 9° Within 120 days of final adoption, the Secretary
of State must serve process on the property owners whose lands are subject to the
public trust and are in violation. el "The notice shall also inform occupants that
after three (3) years, the boundary as set forth in the certified map shall become

79. See supra note 75. The preamble states that the Legislature finds that:
certainty and stability of the land titles . . . along the shores of the tidally affected waters of the state are
essential to the economic welfare of the state and to the peace, tranquility and financial security of the
many thousands of citizens who own such lands . . . . The Legislature finds, in accordance with justice
and sound policy, that resolving these problems in the manner herein set out would create far less harm
and be of greater benefit to the state and its citizens in terms of preventing economic . . . loss of industry
and loss of revenue to the state than any benefits which would be derived from any attempt to completely
rectify unregulated wetlands use which has occurred in the past ....
Id.
80. MISS.

CODE ANN. § 29-15-5 (Supp. 1989).
81. Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-7(1) (Supp. 1989).

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-7(2) (Supp. 1989).
85. Id.
86. Id. This provision is an acknowledgement of the confused state of the law in Mississippi regarding ownership of public trust tidelands that have been filled by strangers. See supm note 31 and accompanying text.
87. Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-17(1) (Supp. 1989).
88. Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-7(3) (Supp. 1989).
89. Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-7(4) (Supp. 1989).

90. Id.
91. Id.
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final unless the occupant has submitted a contrary claim ....

"92

The affected

property owners will "have six months to negotiate and settle differences with the
Secretary of State," although extensions may be granted.93
If an affected property owner cannot settle a dispute with the Secretary of State
as to the location of a boundary of the public trust within six months after notice,
either party can file suit in the chancery court where the property is located. 94 In
any judicial proceeding, the State has the burden of proving by a preponderance of
evidence that the land is subject to the trust.95 "Nothing in the [legislation] is intended to preclude any party from pursuing remedies otherwise available at law,
. .except that if no action is taken by the occupant within three years (3),
the boundary .. .shall become final."96

The legislation establishes a special "Public Trust Tidelands Fund" to be administered by the Secretary of State. 7 Revenue from lease rentals, except those derived from mineral leases, are to be transferred to the special fund." The
Secretary of State may use the funds to cover administrative costs only. 99 Any remaining funds "shall be disbursed pro rata to the local taxing authorities for replacement of" ad valorem taxes.1"' Any funds that remain after distribution to
local taxing authorities shall go "to the Bureau of Marine Resources for new and
extra programs of tidelands management."10 1
Once trust lands have been leased, the lessee is "responsible for any county or
municipal tax levy upon the leasehold interest.""0 2 "All Public Trust Tidelands belonging to the State of Mississippi or any of its political subdivisions shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation."103 The maximum lease period of public trust
lands is increased to forty years with an option to renew for an additional twentyfive years.104 The holder of a lease has "a prior right, exclusive of all other persons, to re-lease" the property as agreed between the holder and the Secretary of
State. 0 5 Each lease shall have rent adjustment every five years tied to the Consumer Price Index or appraisal, whichever is greater.10 If the original rental was
tied to ad valorem tax rolls, then rent review will likewise be tied to such tax
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-7(5) (Supp. 1989).
95. Id.
96. MISS. CODE ANN. § 29-15-7(6) (Supp. 1989).
97. Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-9 (Supp. 1989).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-11 (Supp. 1989).
103. Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-31-39 (Supp. 1990).
104. Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-1-107(2) (Supp. 1989). The method of calculating individual lease rentals is
within the discretion of the Secretary of State and is not mentioned in the legislation. The Blue Ribbon Commission on Public Trust Tidelands did make certain recommendations in this area. See supra note 53, at 34-38. A
summary of the recommendations can be found in Jarman & McLaughlin, supra note 55, at 2593-97.
105. Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-1-107(2) (Supp. 1989).
106. Id.
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rolls."' If no agreement can be reached on a rental amount, "the lease may be
cancelled at the option of the state."' 08 Current occupants who developed public
trust property after July 1, 1973, "shall pay an annual rental based on the fair market value" of the property. 09
' Finally, all public projects that serve a higher public
purpose are "exempt from any use or rental fees."" 0
D. Background of Current Litigation
The Secretary of State responded promptly to the tidelands legislation by requesting that the Mississippi Attorney General file a lawsuit on his behalf as
trustee of the state's public trust tidelands. 1 ' The suit sought declaratory judgment
on whether the statutory requirement to delineate the public trust boundary as the
mean high water line nearest to July 1, 1973, was a violation of section 95 of the
Mississippi Constitution of 1890, which reads: "Lands belonging to, or under the
control of the state, shall never be donated directly or indirectly, to private corporations or individuals . .1.1.
According to the Secretary of State, the tidelands legislation, as enacted, is in
violation of Mississippi's Constitution and the common law as interpreted by the
United States and the Mississippi Supreme Courts in the Phillips Petroleum Co.
and Cinque Bambini litigation. 113 He argued that, were he to delineate the boundary as mandated in the legislation, the title question would not be settled because
private owners would still be subject to legal challenge based upon the court's rulings regarding state sovereignty, since 1817, over trust lands."' He also contended that it would be a waste of state tax dollars to prepare a preliminary map
based on the tidelands legislation only to have it struck down later in court.'
Because of the delay in settling individual boundary disputes as a result of the
pending litigation, the Secretary of State implemented an imminent transfer program.' 6 Under this program, landowners whose situations require immediate relief or who do not wish to wait for further court decisions may split the cost of a

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-1-107(3) (Supp. 1989). See also Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-27-1 (Supp. 1990).
110. Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-13 (Supp. 1989).
111. The action was originally filed on June 5, 1989, in the Chancery Court of Hinds County, Mississippi.
Byrd v. State, No. 138681, slip op. (Ch. Ct. of Hinds County, Miss. June 5, 1989). This suit, in effect, pitted the
State of Mississippi against itself and created the unusual situation in which the Mississippi Attorney General had
to represent both plaintiff and defendant in the action. This conflict was resolved by appointing an attorney from
the Attorney General's office to represent the Secretary of State and an outside counsel to represent the State of
Mississippi.
112. MISS. CONST. art. 4, § 95.

113. See generally Nelson, supra note 36, at 12. The author, James 0. Nelson, II, is Assistant Secretary of State
for Public Lands. Copy is on file with the Mississippi College Law Review.
114. Id. The most likely scenario would be a legal challenge by an environmental organization or other citizen's rights group interested in making sure that the state's public trust tidelands remain under public control.
115. Id.
116. Press Release from Office of the Mississippi Secretary of State (May 23, 1989). In Secretary of State
Molpus' Press Release, he provided that an application for affected property owners could be obtained from the

Secretary of State's Coast Office. A copy of the "Application for Expedited Determination of Public Trust
Boundary" is on file with the Mississippi College Law Review.
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survey of their land, if necessary, with the Office of the Secretary of State. 11 7 The
public trust boundary will be delineated based upon the Blue Ribbon Commission's recommendations, rather than the tidelands legislation.118 Both parties
would be bound by the results. 119
Meanwhile, on January 18, 1989, William D. Byrd filed suit in the Chancery
Court of Harrison County, Mississippi, to confirm his title to ocean front property
used as a car dealership.12 Mr. Byrd's coastal property includes a small portion
seaward of a seawall constructed by the Harrison County Board of Supervisors in
1953 to protect U.S. Highway 90,121 as well as an area landward of the seawall that
was created by fill deposited by the county during construction. 2 2 After passage
of the tidelands legislation, Mr. Byrd learned that the Secretary of State intended
to file suit in Hinds County, Mississippi, seeking to have the legislation ruled unconstitutional. 23 In an effort to have the action heard before a court of his choosing, Mr. Byrd amended his original complaint to include a request for declaratory
judgment that the tidelands legislation be declared constitutional. 124
The suit filed in Hinds County was stayed pending resolution of the action in
Harrison County. 12' Two banks, the State of Mississippi, the City of Biloxi, and
Harrison County joined Mr. Byrd in asserting the constitutionality of the tidelands
legislation. 128 The Secretary of State filed a counterclaim seeking declaratory relief with respect to the tidelands legislation. 127 Legal briefs in support of the constitutionality of the tidelands legislation were submitted by William D. Byrd1 28 and
the State of Mississippi.1 29 The Mississippi Secretary of State submitted a brief
challenging the legislation's constitutionality.' 3 0 In addition, Karl Wiesenburg, a

117. Press Release from Office of the Mississippi Secretary of State, at 1 (May 23, 1989).
118. See id. at 3-4.
119. See id.

120. Byrd v. State, No. 17,879, slip op. (Ch. Ct. of Harrison County, Miss. Apr. 18, 1990). On appeal to the
Mississippi Supreme Court (No. 90TS692).
121. Brief for Plaintiff, William D. Byrd, Byrd v. State, No. 17,879, at 2. On Appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court (No. 90TS692) [hereinafter Byrd Brief].
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Brief of Counter-Plaintiff, Secretary of State of Mississippi, Byrd v. State, No. 17,789 (Ch. Ct. of
Harrison County, Miss.). On appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court, (No. 90TS692) [hereinafter Secretary of
State Brief].
128. See Byrd Brief.
129. See Brief of Defendant, State of Mississippi, Byrd v. State, No. 17,879 (Ch. Ct. of Harrison County,
Miss.). On appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court (No. 90TS692) [hereinafter State of Mississippi Brief].
130. Secretary of State Brief, supra note 127.
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riparian owner of property in Jackson County, Mississippi, filed a late brief after
being granted permission to join as counter-plaintiff with the Secretary of State.' 31
Argument on the declaratory judgment was heard on April 16, 1989, before
Chancellor William L. Stewart, the same judge whose tideland opinion had been
affirmed by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Cinque Bambini'32 and the United
States Supreme Court in Phillips Petroleum Co. 133 Chancellor Stewart ruled immediately following oral argument that the tidelands legislation is constitutional.' 34
On April 25, 1990, shortly after the ruling by the chancery court, the Secretary
of State published preliminary maps of public trust tidelands as directed by the
tidelands legislation. 13' The maps depict both the historical tideland prior to development, and the 1973 line, which is essentially the current mean high water
line. 13' A judicial stay has since been entered enjoining the Secretary of State
from publishing final maps pending the Mississippi Supreme Court's determination of the tidelands legislation's constitutionality. 3 7
According to the preliminary maps, approximately 1500 acres of tidelands in
Mississippi have been filled, in addition to the public sand beaches south of the
seawalls. 138 Nearly 1350 acres have been filled by federal, state, or local government entities to serve as ports, small craft harbors, dredged material containment
sites, or industrial parks. 139 Generally, these filled tideland areas will not be af131. Mr. Wiesenburg died suddenly in July, 1990. In addition to being a coastal landowner, Mr. Wiesenburg
was an attorney and former member of the Mississippi State Legislature. During his career, Mr. Wiesenburg has
served as legal counsel for the State Highway Commission, Jackson County, Mississippi, the Jackson County Port
Authority, the Pascagoula Port Commission, and the City of Pascagoula. He authored several pieces of coastal
legislation and was "involved for approximately forty years with questions as to the status of the public trust tidelands of the State of Mississippi." Motion of Karl Wiesenburg, a Riparian Landowner, to Join as a Counter-Plaintiff with the Secretary of State or, alternatively, to File an Amicus Curiae Brief in This Cause, Byrd v. State, No.
17,879 (Ch. Ct. of Harrison County, Miss.). On appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court (No. 90TS692).
132. Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986).
133. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
134. Byrd v. State, No. 17,879, slip op. (Ch. Ct. of Harrison County, Miss. Apr. 18, 1990).
135. Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-7 (Supp. 1989). Much of the information in this section comes from a paper
entitled "Resolving Title Claims to Filled Submerged Lands in Mississippi," which was presented by Margaret A.
Bretz at the Western States Lands Commissioners Summer Conference, Duluth, Minnesota, July, 1990 [hereinafter Bretz]. See also Florida Eng'g Servs. Corp., Project Report, Identification of Public Trust Tidelands, Apr.,
1990; and Mississippi Secretary of State, PreliminaryMap ofPublic Trust Tidelands, Apr. 25, 1990 (These maps
are available for inspection at the Secretary of State's office in both Jackson, Miss. and Gulfport, Miss.; in each of
the the chancery clerk's offices in the three Mississippi coastal counties; and in all public libraries in each of the
three Mississippi coastal counties. Copies of the maps may be purchased from the Public Lands Division of the
Secretary of State's office in Jackson, Miss.).
136. Bretz, supra note 135, at 6.
137. Id.
138. There are approximately 26 miles of publicly filled sand beaches below the seawall along Highway 90.
There are additional sand beaches created or replenished below some of the other publicly constructed seawalls
in Bay St. Louis, Waveland, Ocean Springs, and Pascagoula. These beaches are designated as part of the public
trust tidelands in the Secretary of State's Preliminary Maps. However, because of the unsettled state of the law in
Mississippi governing man-made sand beaches, and because very little, if any, construction has taken place directly on them, these beaches will not be included in this discussion of the extent and character of filled tidelands.
See supra note 135.
139. Bretz, supranote 135, at 2-3. Public projects include 08.8 acres at the Port of Gulfport; 526.4 acres at
Singing River Island; 436.5 acres at Ingalls Peninsula; 137. 1acres at Bayou Cassotte Industrial Park; 5.9 acres at
Bayou Bernard Industrial Park; and 2.9 acres at Clay Point Industrial Park. Id. See also Florida Eng'g Servs.
Corp., supra note 135.
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fected by the tidelands legislation because title to the property remains vested in
the State of Mississippi. Moreover, the legislation exempts all public projects that
serve a "higher public purpose" from any use or rental fees. 14
About ninety acres of the approximately 150 acres of privately-developed filled
tidelands that remain were created in association with seafood processing
plants.141 Beginning in the 1870's, tidelands were filled with oyster shells, and
canning factories were constructed and expanded on top of them.142 Most of this
property is located in Biloxi, although the cities of Waveland and Pass Christian
Yacht clubs, restaurants, semi-trailer
also have some shell-filled tidelands. 1
parking lots, condominiums, and other public and private enterprises have replaced seafood plants as the primary occupants. 144 The final sixty acres consist of
approximately fifteen acres of filled tideland property in Hancock County, developed as residential subdivisions between 1940 and 1970; forty acres of tidelands
located upland from two large recreational piers; eight acres of tidelands created
by dredge spoil in connection with the construction of Popp's Ferry Bridge; and a
few acres of fill that now support a natural wetland in an area south of the seawall. 145
Although relatively small in acreage, tideland areas filled prior to 1973 represent some of the most valuable coastal property in the state. The vast majority of
this property was developed by public port commissions and other governmental
entities pursuant to specific legislative authorization. 146 Port commissions are authorized to sublease the property for commercial development or other purposes
for a period not exceeding forty years on "such terms and conditions, and with
such safeguards, as will best promote and protect the public interest."147 Nevertheless, title problems may arise when public bodies acquire for port, recreational,
and other uses, lands originally filled by private persons for private purposes. At
least one current instance exists in which a city is leasing space from a private
yacht club for use as a free parking area for recreational and commercial users of
the city's harbor. "
Clearly, private owners of the remaining ten percent of the tidelands developed
before 1973 will become the prime beneficiaries should the tidelands legislation
be upheld on appeal. By awarding these coastal property owners fee simple title,
the state foregoes all rental fees and allows the owners to retain all rights of alienation and use, subject only to certain statutory environmental and zoning restric-

140. "Higher public purpose" has been defined as "promoting the conservation, reclamation, preservation of
the tidelands and submerged lands, public use for fishing, recreation or navigation, or the enhancement of public
access to such lands." Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-13 (Supp. 1989).
141. Bretz, supra note 135, at 2.
142. Id. at 1-2.
143. See id. at2.
144. Id. at2.
145. Id. at 3.
146. Miss. CODE ANN.§ 59-1-1 to -45 (1972 & Supp. 1990).
147. Miss. CODE ANN.§ 59-1-17(3) (1972 & Supp. 1990).
148. Bretz, supra note 135, at 3.
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tions.14 9 Title insurance companies that have issued policies to coastal property
owners and lending institutions that have used coastal property as security for
loans will also receive significant benefits should the legislation be upheld.
While the largest and most exposed underwriter of title insurance has almost
uniformly chosen not to insure Mississippi waterfront property during the past two
years, a number of other insurance companies have issued policies based in part
on case-by-case opinions from the Secretary of State concerning tidelands boundaries on individual parcels."' Similarly, the drying-up of bank financing for the
purchase or expansion of homes and businesses has not materialized.
Unquestionably, the Legislature has a legitimate concern for the economic
well-being of coastal property owners, lenders, and insurers. Much less clear,
however, is whether the Legislature has the legal authority to favor the interests of
this select group over the rights of other citizens who seek to protect and preserve
the state's public trust tideland areas.
IV. SUMMARY OF THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE CHANCERY COURT
IN SUPPORT OF TIDELANDS LEGISLATION' 51

A. Purposesof the Public Trust Under State Law
Plaintiffs assert that the Legislature has both the power to determine the parameters of private and public ownership, as these parameters affect the public trust
lands, and to develop the procedures for implementation of these parameters.152

Once Mississippi acquired its trust lands upon statehood, the only law applicable

149. Because the tidelands legislation excludes tidelands filled before 1973 from being considered part of the
public trust, the Coastal Wetlands Protection Law, Miss. CoDE ANN. § 49-27-1 to -69 (Supp. 1989), would not
be applicable to the filled properties. The Act defines "coastal wetlands" as "all publicly owned lands subject to
the ebb and flow of the tide[;] which are below the watermark of ordinary high tide[;] . . .and all publicly
owned submerged water-bottoms below the watermark of ordinary high tide." Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-27-5(a)
(Supp. 1989).
150. Bretz, supra note 135, at 4.
151. The following section summarizes the major legal arguments presented in each of the party's briefs to the
Harrison County Chancery Court. It must be noted that the authors would prefer to take the more traditional
approach of discussing and analyzing the written findings of the court; however, Judge Stewart's findings in Byrd
v. State, No. 17,879, slip op. (Ch. Ct. of Harrison County, Miss. Apr. 18, 1990), provide very little material
upon which to base such an analysis. By summarizing the principal arguments from the primary briefs, the authors hope to enable readers to better understand the legal analysis provided in later portions ofthe article. Space
and organizational considerations prevent any mention of arguments from reply briefs. Readers may obtain copies of the legal briefs and judicial opinion by contacting the Clerk of Court, Harrison County Courthouse, 101
East Washington Street, P.O. Box 235, Biloxi, MS 39533.
152. Byrd Brief, supra note 121, at 18. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988), rehg denied, 486 U.S. 1018 (1988), was cited for the proposition that individual states have the authority to define the
limits of the land held in public trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as they see fit. See Byrd Brief,
supra note 121, at 18.
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to Mississippi water bottoms became state law."5 ' The plaintiffs claim that the
State Legislature has exclusive authority to enact statutes that control property and
define the rights of owners in relation to the state. 5 4 Citing previous Mississippi
Supreme Court decisions, the plaintiffs argue that the Legislature has a duty to
protect and administer public trust property.155 According to the plaintiffs, Treuting v. Bridge & Park Commission1 51 is of particular importance because the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the right of the Legislature to authorize, by general
legislation, sale of a portion of Deer Island and adjacent submerged lands to the
Biloxi Park Commission for construction of a proposed forty-million dollar construction project. 7 The submerged land at issue was to be developed for use as a
residential community.15 1 Twenty-seven percent of the project was scheduled to
be devoted to public uses, including golf courses, beaches, parks, green belts,
schools, and other purposes; twenty percent would be allocated to street right-ofways; the remaining fifty-three percent would be placed in private ownership. 5 9
The Treuting court specifically found that the overall purpose of the proposed development of Deer Island promoted a large number of public interests and uses,
and that "incidental private ownership of parts of the development [was] not inconsistent with the public trust in tho submerged lands." 6 ' Therefore, the plaintiffs
assert that Treuting provides clear guidance concerning the purposes of the public

153. Id. at 22 (citing Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 512 (Miss. 1986), cert. granted,
479 U.S. 1084 (1987), affd sub. nom. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, reh'g denied, 486
U.S. 1018 (1988)). In support of their position, the plaintiffs quoted Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 378 (1977) (quoting Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 155
(1944)) ("Under our federal system, property ownership is not governed by a general federal law, but rather by
the laws of the several States. 'The great body of law in this country which controls acquisition, transmission,
and transfer of property, and defines the rights of its owners in relation to the state or to private parties, is found in
the statutes and decisions of the state.' "). See Byrd Brief, supra note 121, at 22.
154. Id. at 22-23. It is also mentioned that the incongruous nature of state law is a result of the decisions of the
Mississippi Supreme Court in Morgan v. Reading, 11 Miss. 366 (1844), limited by, Commissioners of Homochitto River v. Withers, 29 Miss. 21, 33-34 (1855), and Steamboat Magnolia v. Marshall, 39 Miss. 109 (1860),
which permit private parties to own non-tidally affected navigable rivers. See Byrd Brief, supranote 121, at 23.
It seems to defy logic that the same court could find the 1989 tidelands legislation unconstitutional when this
legislation is merely trying to protect and preserve the remaining part of the trust by defining its limits. See id. at
24.
155. Byrd Brief, supra note 121, at 24-33, provides a chronological discussion of the development of the tidally
affected trust as the trust evolved through judicial decisions of the Mississippi Supreme Court. Most of these
cases are only peripherally related to the issue at hand and no point would be served by discussing each one.
Those cited decisions that provide some support for the Legislature's role in defining the public trust include:
Henritzy v. Harrison County, 178 So. 322 (Miss. 1938) (for the proposition that a vast amount of power is vested
in the Legislature, and the court must give effect to the intention of the Legislature even though it may seem harsh
to the court), Byrd Brief, supra note 121, at 27; Crary v. State Highway Comm'n, 68 So. 2d 468 (Miss. 1953)
(provides additional evidence of the Legislature's authority to harmonize public and private interests, which at
first glance seem to be inconsistent) Byrd Brief, supra note 121, at 28; Harrison County v. Guice, 140 So. 2d 838
(Miss. 1962) (the State's ownership of the bottoms of tidally affected waters "is essentially ownership of the bottoms as bottoms"), Byrd Brief, supra note 121, at 29.
156. Treuting v. Bridge & Park Comm'n of Biloxi, 199 So. 2d 627 (Miss. 1967).
157. The proposed Deer Island development never took place.
158. Byrd Brief, supra note 121, at 31.
159. Id. See Treuting, 199 So. 2d at 631.
160. Treuting, 199 So. 2d at 634.
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trust and the role of the trustee. 1 The Treuting court recognized that Biloxi, Mis'
sissippi, was "in urgent need of physical space for expansion."162
The plaintiffs
thus assert that denying the Legislature the right to alienate tidelands now would
be inconsistent with the public trust, which the state is charged with administering. 163
B. No DonationBecause Legislation Serves HigherPublicPurpose
Plaintiffs claim further that legislation affecting public trust land does not
amount to a donation in violation of section 95 of the Mississippi Constitution if it
achieves a "higher public purpose."'64 In this instance, the higher public purpose
to be served is resolving the discord which is causing extensive and intolerable
harm to the public's enjoyment of the state's public trust lands.165 The purposes
and interests served by the tidelands legislation, therefore, provide beyond any
doubt sufficient grounds to enforce and uphold the validity and constitutionality of
the legislation. 16 For example, without the tidelands legislation, each of the thousands of water front properties would be treated separately and owners would be
confronted with the time-consuming and expensive process of defending their

161. Byrd Brief, supra note 121, at 34-35, asserted that Treuting recognized at least five duties imposed on the
State in carrying out its public trust responsibilities: (1) the State must use such property so as not to interfere
with riparian rights of upland owners; (2) the State must recognize that there is a consequential private trust associated with these water bottoms in favor of the upland owners; (3) the State must not frustrate any attempt to put
litteral (riparian) property to meaningful use, public or otherwise; (4) the State must recognize the totality of the
development and not isolate one part of the development away from another part; and (5) the State must recognize
and accommodate a city's need for physical space for expansion. Id.
162. Byrd Brief, supra note 121, at 34 (quoting Theuting, 199 So. 2d at 629).
163. Plaintiffs buttress their conclusion with State ex rel. Rice v. Stewart, 184 Miss. 202, 184 So. 44 (1938)
which held that the State, as absolute owner of the title to the soil and minerals in the beds of the shores, arms,
and inlets of the sea, had "the consequent right to use or dispose of any portion thereof, when that can be done
without impairment of the interest of the public in the waters . . . ." 184 Miss. at 230, 184 So. at 50.
164. Byrd Brief, supra note 121, at 3. See also State of Mississippi Brief, supra note 129, at 12 (citing Treuting,
199 So. 2d at 633).
165. Purposes expressly noted within the legislation include: (1) resolution of the uncertainty and disputes that
have plagued the coastal counties for decades; (2) recognition of an allowance for economic growth and development as well as an increase in jobs for the community; (3) encouragement of the recreation and tourism while
promoting the preservation of the natural state of the tidelands and their ecosystems; and (4) generation of funds
to be used for the protection and regeneration of these areas. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 29-15-1, -3, -9 (Supp. 1989).
166. In the view of William Byrd, in order for the Secretary of State to prevail on his theory of donation, the
following must be clearly shown: (1) that the "rights of the public to the use of the public trust land and waters
have been impaired;" (2) that the "purposes of the trust are diminished;" (3) that "there has been a donation not
incidental to a higher public purpose;" (4) that there is "some diminution of the area available to the public;" (5)
that there is "some interference with the chief public purposes of the trust-commerce, navigation, and fisheries;" (6) that the "totality of the things sought to be accomplished by the Legislature does not promote the public
trust;" (7) that the "Legislative exercise of public policy is totally inconsistent with the public trust which the State
is charged with administering;" and (8) after a showing of all ofthe above, that the "strong presumption of constitutionality has been clearly overcome-that the [Legislation] is clearly, and beyond a reasonabledoubt, unconstitutional . . . ."(Byrd Brief, supranote 121, at 36-37). None of the above requirements can be met according to
Byrd. No legal authority was provided in support of the listed criteria. Id.
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claims. 7 In addition, because the Legislature has wide latitude to make legislative declarations and findings of fact,"8 8 such as those in the tidelands legislation,
and all legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional, 6 ' they conclude
the statute should be upheld.' 70
C. Secretary of State Has Authority to Determine the Public Trust
Boundary Based Upon the Common Law
Plaintiffs' second section 95 argument postulates that no donation has taken
place because the Secretary of State has discretion to revise the boundary in accordance with the common law.' They claim that the tidelands legislation fully
recognizes that the established body of common law pertaining to the tidelands
should be observed in interpreting the statute and in establishing the public trust
boundary. 72
' The Secretary of State is directed to allow a sixty-day period after
publication of the preliminary map to receive comments, documentation, and
other information, which he is to use "at his discretion" to compile a final tidelands
map.7 3 Plaintiffs assert that comments from all possible interests, including the
Secretary of State's own office, may be submitted during this comment period.
After the sixty days, the Secretary of State may make revisions "at his discretion,"' 74 and he also has the last word in determining
where the boundary will be
75
1
law.
common
the
with
accordance
in
located
D. The Legislation Is Not Severable
Their final assertion relates to the lack of a severability clause in the tidelands
legislation. 76 They view the legislation as a comprehensive procedure which may
not be divided without defeating its purpose and intent. 177 Because the twelve
parts of the legislation are interrelated, they must act in concert.' 78 Therefore they

167. Byrd Brief, supra note 121, at 37-38. Moreover, they argue that the Secretary of State's classification of
the legislation as a donation ignores the following statement in Guice: " 'The state's ownership of the bottoms of
the submerged land is essentially ownership of the bottoms as bottoms.' "Id. at 38 (quoting Guice, 140 So. 2d at
842). They reason that a careful reading of Mississippi cases indicates that the higher public purposes all have to
do with enjoyment of submerged lands under tidal waters, while the only land affected by the tidelands legislation
is filled property. Therefore, state ownership of submerged property remains unchanged. Id.
168. Id. at 12.
169. Id. at 15.
170. Id. at 51.
171. State of Mississippi Brief, supra note 129, at 9.
172. Id. at 8 (citing Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-7(2) (Supp. 1989)).
173. Id. at 9 (citing Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-7(4) (Supp. 1989)).
174. Id.
175. ld.
176. Id. at 15.
177. Id.
178. Id. (citing Brady v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 342 So. 2d 295 (Miss. 1977)).
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conclude that any separation based upon a ruling of unconstitutionality would
cause the entire legislation to fail. 179
E. Disastrous Consequencesof Ruling of Unconstitutionality
To lend support to their legal arguments, plaintiffs predict that a finding of unconstitutionality would disturb thousands, if not tens of thousands, of titles on the
Mississippi Gulf Coast and along tidally affected estuaries and rivers. 180 As a
result, the state and its citizens would be needlessly subjected to expensive and
time-consuming litigation and would have to cope with the adverse economic effects described in the preamble to the tidelands legislation. 18' The Mississippi
courts have recognized the importance of honoring reasonable expectations in
property interests. 182 Only the Legislature has the duty, authority, and mechanisms to find solutions to great public issues such as the one presented here.' 83
Therefore, the legislation should be upheld.
V. SUMMARY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTS TO THE CHANCERY COURT IN
OPPOSITION TO TIDELANDS LEGISLATION

A. The Legislation Constitutes a Conveyance of Trust Properties
to PrivatePersons in Violation of the Public Trust Doctrine
The Secretary of State disputes the assertion in the tidelands legislation's preamble that "a dispute has developed

. . .

calling into question titles and legal is-

sues believed secure and determined from the date of statehood."'" To the
contrary, he argues that this statement conflicts with previous determinations of

179. Id. In support of this conclusion, the State quoted Quinn v. Branning, 404 So. 2d 1018 (Miss. 1981),
which declared:
"[I]t is the Court's duty in passing on the constitutionality of a statute to separate the valid from the invalid
part, if this can be done, and to permit the valid part to stand unless the different parts of the statute are so
intimately connected with and dependent upon each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all cannot be carried into effect, it would not have enacted the residue
independently."
State of Mississippi Brief, supra note 129, at 9 (quoting Quinn, 404 So. 2d at 1020). See also Lovorn v. Hathorn,
365 So. 2d 947,950 (Miss. 1979); Wilson v. Jones County Bd. of Supervisors, 342 So. 2d 1293, 1296 (Miss.
1977); Howell v. State, 300 So. 2d 774, 781 (Miss. 1974).
180. Byrd Brief, supra note 121, at 41.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 42. The court quoted Moore v. Kuljis, 207 So. 2d 604 (Miss. 1967), which stated:
"The Chancery Court held that the subject land was susceptible of private ownership, under the two Skrmetta cases and the Guice case. HarrisonCounty v. Guice, 244 Miss. 95, 140 So. 2d 838 (1962); Skrmetta v. Moore, 227 Miss. 119, 86 So. 2d46 (t956); Skrmetta v. Moore, 202 Miss. 585, 30 So. 2d 53
(1947). It further observed that to rule otherwise would have disastrousconsequences by disturbinginnuierabletitles on the coast, many ofwhich have been developedand occupied over a periodofmany years at
great costs."
Byrd Brief, supra note 121, at 42 (quoting Moore, 207 So. 2d at 614) (emphasis added).
183. Id. at 42-43.
184. Section 1 of 1989 Miss. LAws ch. 495, (Preamble to Tidelands Legislation).
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the Mississippi Supreme Court in Cinque Bambini,18 and the United States SuMississippi's ownership
preme Court in PhillipsPetroleum Co., '86which affirmed
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time
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from
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trust
by law of public
Furthermore, he asserts that Mississippi case law clearly provides that neither
the state nor the federal government can validly convey title in fee simple to land
under tidewater to private owners for private purposes. 188 The tidelands legislation is an attempt to do, through legislation, precisely what has been rejected by
the courts.189 He claims that if the Legislature has sought "to confirm the mean
high water boundary line as determined by the Mississippi Supreme Court, the
laws of this state and this chapter," 9 ' then the provision directing that the boundary in developed areas be established at the mean high water line nearest the effective date of the Coastal Wetlands Protection Act must be declared invalid.191
B. Public Trust Tidelands CannotLawfully Be
Conveyed to Private Personsfor PrivatePurposes
The Secretary of State reads Mississippi case law relating to alienation of public
trust land differently from the plaintiffs. He cites the 1928 Mississippi Supreme
Court decision in Money v. Wood 92 which unreservedly recognized that " 'the
state, as trustee, has no right or power to dispose of such [public trust] lands in any
manner or extent inconsistent with the purpose for which the trust exists.' "193 The
opinion further proclaims that "the state cannot convey in fee such rights to private
owners for private purposes."194 The Secretary of State then traces Money's progeny which he claims hold that state public trust tidelands cannot lawfully be con-

185. Secretary of State Brief, supra note 127, at 7. The Secretary of State quoted Cinque Bambini Partnership
v. Mississippi, 491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986), which stated: "Our cases suggest that, once held by the State in
trust, properties are committed to the public purpose and may be alienated from the State only upon the authority
of legislative enactment and then only consistent with the public purposes of the trust." Secretary of State Brief,
supra note 127, at 7 (quoting Cinque Bambini, 491 So. 2d at 519).
186. Id. at 7. The court noted that the State's claim to tidelands along the shore has been clear, unequivocal,
and consistently held from the time of statehood. PHILLIPS PETROLEUM Co., 484 U.S. at 482.
187. Secretary of State Brief, supra note 127, at 7.
188. Id. at 8 (citing Rouse v. Saucier's Heirs, 166 Miss. 704, 146 So. 291 (1933) and International Paper Co. v.
Mississippi State Highway Dep't, 271 So. 2d 395 (Miss. 1973)).
note 202, at 8, where it is pointed out that the argument that coastal
189. Id. Also see Wiesenburg Brief, infra
property owners were ignorant of the fact that they could not acquire title to artificially dredged tidelands is negated by two letters addressed to the State Land Commissioner from the Mississippi Attorney General's office
dated July 20, 1954 and September 7, 1954, respectively. These letters, attached as Exhibits "C" and "D" to the
Wiesenburg Brief, reflected the opinion of the Attorney General that the State Legislature has no authority to
authorize private persons to acquire any interest in public trust tidelands.
190. Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-3 (Supp. 1989).
191. Secretary of State Brief, supra note 127, at 8-9.
192. 118 So. 357 (Miss. 1928).
193. Secretary of State Brief, supra note 127, at 9-10 (quoting Money v. Wood, 118 So. 357, 359 (Miss.
1928)). The Secretary of State pointed out that "Money intended to develop tidewater lands in the Mississippi
Sound 'by dredging, filling, and raising' the submerged land and constructing a hotel and convention hall upon
it." Id. (quoting Money, 118 So. at 358).
194. Money, 118 So. at 359.
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veyed to private persons for private use.195 The Secretary of State thus concludes
that since the Mississippi Supreme Court proclaimed in 1857 that "the shores of
the sea below high water mark belong to the State as trustee for the public," the
courts have carefully and painstakingly, with few departures, defined and protected this great trust of the people of Mississippi.' 9 6 The tidelands legislation,
however, relegates the tidelands trust to the political arena, where all persons are
not of equal standing.197 It creates a special class of persons, those who encroached onto trust tidelands prior to 1973, and rewards them with ownership of
lands that are not subject to private ownership.' 9 8 He asserts that determinations
regarding the trust should not be made because of political considerations, but
should continue to be made through the non-political deliberations and decisions
of the courts.' 9 9
C. The Law Conflicts with the Mississippi and
United States Constitutions

1. No Donation of Public Property to Private Parties
The Secretary of State further argues that section 95 of article 4 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 explicitly prohibits the donation of public lands either
directly or indirectly to private corporations or individuals."' 0 Therefore, the tidelands legislation's validation of all encroachments on the public trust tidelands
prior to July 1973, which results in vesting title to persons who either ignorantly or
knowingly were guilty of such encroachment, amounts to an uncompensated grant
of title to public property in violation of section 95.201

195. Secretary of State Brief, supra note 127, at 9-11. The Secretary of State quoted Rouse v. Saucier's Heirs,
146 So. 291 (Miss. 1933), which stated: "[N]either the state nor the federal government can validly convey title
in fee simple to [tidelands] . . . to private owners for private purposes." Secretary of State Brief, supra note 127,
at 9-11 (quoting Rouse, 146 So. at 292). The Secretary of State also cited State ex rel. Rice v. Stewart, 184 So. 44
(Miss. 1938) (The state, as trustee, was entitled to recover the value of sand and gravel dredged from the bed of
tidal area, implicitly reiterating the prohibition against converting public trust property to private use.). Secretary of State Brief, supra note 127, at 10 (citing Stewart, 184 So. 44). Finally, the Secretary of State cited Crary
v. State Highway Comm'n, 68 So. 2d 468 (Miss. 1954) (In both cases, the court unequivocally held that tidelands
are owned by the State as trustee for its people, and that the rights of riparian owners are mere revocable privileges or licenses subject to the superior right of the State to impose an overriding public use upon the tidelands.).
Secretary of State Brief, supra note 127, at 11 (citing Crary, 68 So. 2d 468).
196. Secretary of State Brief, supra note 127, at 14 (quoting Martin v. O'Brien, 34 Miss. 21,36 (Miss. 1857)).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 5 (citing State v. Southern Pine Co., 205 Miss. 80, 38 So. 2d 442 (1949)) (holding that a "donation"
is: the act or contract by which a person voluntarily transfers the title to a thing of which he is the owner, from
himself to another, without any consideration, as a free gift). The brief cites Tally v. Board of Supervisors, 353
So. 2d 774 (Miss. 1978); Bragg v. Carter, 367 So. 2d 165 (Miss. 1978); Keys v. Carter, 318 So. 2d 862 (Miss.
1975); and Holmes v. Jones, 318 So. 2d 865 (Miss. 1975), as decisions that have ruled that where there is gross
inadequacy of consideration, a conveyance amounts to an unconstitutional donation of public property in violation of section 95 of the Mississippi Constitution.
201. Secretary of State Brief, supra note 127, at 6 (citing Wilmut Gas & Oil Co. v. Covington County, 221
Miss. 613, 71 So. 2d 184 (1954)). See also infra note 202, at 4-5.
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2. Tidelands Legislation Violates Due Process
Intervenor Wiesenburg raises a due process issue. 2 He contends that the citizens of the State of Mississippi cannot be deprived of their rights to public trust
tidelands by an act of the Legislature under section 14 of article 1 of the Mississippi Constitution. 3 Such legislation also violates their right to due process of law
under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United
States, and of their right to equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. 4
Moreover, he asserts that the Legislature cannot destroy the vested rights of the
people,20 5 nor can it diminish the obligations or liabilities of those persons who either ignorantly or knowingly appropriated public trust tidelands for their own use
prior to July 1, 1973.206
D. The Legislation Constitutes a Conveyance in Violation of the
State's FiduciaryDuty as Trustee

The Secretary of State argues further that common law rules enforceable in the
case of private trusts are applicable to lands held in public trust." According to
the Mississippi Supreme Court, the State, like other trustees, must exercise a
higher degree of care in administration of the trust than in the management of its
individual personal business; basically it needs more care than is needed in attending to state business. 0 8 The essence of a trust is the relationship of the trustee

202. Brief of Karl Wiesenburg, A Citizen, Taxpayer and Riparian Landowner, In Support of the Brief of the
Secretary of State of the State of Mississippi, Counter-Plaintiff in the Above Styled Case, Byrd v. State, No.
17,879. On appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court (No. 90TS692) [hereinafter Wiesenburg Brief].
203. Id. at 3. Section 14 of article I of the Mississippi Constitution provides: "No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property except by due process of law." Miss. CoNsT. art. 1, § 14.
204. Wiesenburg Brief, supra note 202, at 6.
205.1d. Section 16 of article 3 of the Mississippi Constitution provides: "Ex post facto laws, or laws impairing
the obligation of contract, shall not be passed." MIss. CONST. art. 3, § 16. Tidelands are held by the state, not as
sole proprietor, but in trust for the people of the state. Any attempt by the legislature to destroy the vested right of
the people or the state in the public trust tidelands without their consent runs afoul of the most basic tenets of the
constitutional law. Wiesenburg Brief, supra note 202, at 3-4 (citing Veillion v. Knapp & East, 171 Miss. 608,
158 So. 2d 336 (Miss. 1963). Wiesenburg also quoted Commercial Bank v. Chambers, 8 S. & M 56, 57 (1847)
in which the Mississippi Supreme Court stated:
'It requires no argument to prove that the legislature cannot interfere with vested rights in such a way as to
destroy them. Remedies may be provided in aid of them, but any legislative act which destroys a right, or
transfers it from one to another, against the will of the owner, is void. The fundamental principles of
government forbid it. It is beyond the legitimate power of the legislature. A retrospective statute, affecting and changing vested rights, is very generally considered in this country, says Chancellor Kent, as
founded on unconstitutional principles, and consequently inoperative and void .... '
Wiesenburg Brief, supra note 202, at 3-4 (quoting Commercial Bank, 8 S. & M. at 57).
206. Wiesenburg Brief, supra note 202, at 5. Section 100 of article 4 of the Mississippi Constitution provides:
No obligation or liability of any person, association, or corporation held or owned by this state, or levee
board, or any county, city, or town thereof, shall such liability or obligation be extinguished except by
payment thereof into the proper treasury; nor shall such liability or obligation be exchanged or transferred except upon payment of its face value; but this shall not be construed to prevent the legislature from
providing by general law for the compromise of doubtful claims.
MISS. CONST. art. 4, § 100.
He claims also that public port agencies have paramount rights over the use of public trust tidelands for port
and industrial purposes as against any private claim of ownership. Wiesenburg Brief, supra note 202, at 6-7.
207. Secretary of State Brief, supra note 127, at 15.
208. Id. (citing Humble Oil & Refg v. State, 206 Miss. 847, 41 So. 2d 26 (1949)).
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to the beneficiary and the obligation of the trustee to act only in the interest of the
beneficiary.2" 9 In a trust relationship a trustee cannot sacrifice or place second the
interest of the beneficiary to some real or imagined other interest. Similarly, then,
under Mississippi law, "tidelands held in trust for all the people of Mississippi may
not be conveyed to private individuals for private use."210
E. Those Portionsof the 1989 TidelandsLegislation That Are in
Conflict with the ConstitutionMust Be Declared Void
The Secretary of State asserts the general proposition that, if possible, a statute
must be given such a construction that its parts harmonize with each other and are
rendered consistent.211 He recognizes as well settled, that an unjust or unwise purpose will not be imputed to the Legislature when any other reasonable construc2 12
tion can save it from such imputation.
On the other hand, he claims one of the fundamental principles of our system of
government is that all branches of government are subject to and bound by the
terms of the Constitution, and that legislative enactments contrary to the Constitution are void. 213 Therefore, title to trust lands cannot be confirmed in private individuals, even pursuant to statute, where they have been donated in violation of
section 95 of the Mississippi State Constitution. As a result, the last phrase in section 29-15-7(1)214 which calls on the public trust tideland boundary to be determined nearest the effective date of the Coastal Wetlands Protection Act
unquestionably must be declared unconstitutional.21
Although that portion of the 1989 legislation which is unconstitutional must be
stricken, he asserts the legislation need not be struck in its entirety 216 because un-

209. Id. at 15-16 (citing BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1 (2d ed. 1977) at 1-2; and SCOTT, SCOTT ON TRUSTS §
2.4 (4th ed. 1987).
210. Id. at 16. The Secretary of State quoted State ex rel. Coleman v. Dear, 212 Miss. 620, 55 So. 2d 370
(1951), which stated:
'The State cannot abdicate its duty as trustee of property in which the whole people are interested, such as
sixteenth section land held by the State as trustee for schools, any more than the State can surrender its
police power in the administration of government and in the preservation of peace and order.'
Secretary of State Brief, supra note 127, at 16 (quoting Coleman, 55 So. 2d at 373).
211. Secretary of State Brief, supra note 127, at 17 (citing Coker v. Wilkinson, 141 Miss. 604, 106 So. 886
(1926)).
212. Id. (citing Gambrill v. Gulf States Creosoting Co., 216 Miss. 505, 62 So. 2d 772 (1953) and Aikerson v.
State, 274 So. 2d 124 (Miss. 1973)).
213. Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 1803; State v. Wood, 187 So. 2d 820 (Miss.
1966); and Saxon v. Harvey, 223 So. 2d 620, 624 (Miss. 1969)). The Secretary of State quoted Saxon, which
stated:
'While the legislature generally has the power to enact any law it sees fit, nevertheless, it is restricted in its
enactment of laws by the provisions of our State Constitution and cannot by statutory enactment alter or
nullify a clear, unambiguous mandate of the Constitution. Such a statute would be unconstitutional
• If there exists an irreconcilable conflict . . . then the constitutional provisions must prevail.'
Secretary of State Brief, supra note 127, at 17 (quoting Saon, 223 So. 2d at 624).
214. MIss. CODE §29-15-7(l) (Supp. 1989).
215. Secretary of State Brief, supra note 127, at 18.
216. Id. (citing Wilson v. Jones County Bd. of Supervisors, 342 So. 2d 1293 (Miss. 1977)). Interestingly, the
language quoted is identical to that which was quoted in William Byrd's Brief, see supra note 121 and accompanying text. Of course, the parties interpreted the same language quite differently.

A HIGHER PUBLIC PURPOSE?

19901

certainty with respect to legislative intent does not require the entire legislation to
be stricken.2 17 Clearly, the tidelands legislation was intended to outline a management program for all the public trust tidelands and should not be permitted to convey or donate those tidelands developed prior to 1973.218
He argues further that the absence of a severability clause does not prohibit separation of the constitutional from the unconstitutional portions.219 Moreover,
mere uncertainty about legislative intent with respect to whether the statute would
have been passed without the unconstitutional portion is not sufficient to determine that provisions may not be severed. 220 He notes also that the interpretation
or construction of a statute by the agency responsible for its implementation should
be afforded great deference. 21 Thus, with the exception of the provision donating
tidelands developed prior to 1973 and the declaration of the higher public purpose
that such donation would serve, the procedures incorporated in the tidelands legislation are those that were recommended by the Secretary of State's Office.222 The
recommendations were the result of months of work by a tidelands commission
appointed by the Secretary of State and incorporate the knowledge and expertise22of
3
that agency with respect to the public trust lands and the management thereof.
VI.

OPINION OF THE CHANCERY COURT

In a surprisingly brief opinion, the Chancellor found the tidelands legislation to
be constitutional. 224 After chastising white settlers for shamelessly displacing Native Americans and then, in the spirit of Easter time, forgiving them,225 the court
categorized the legislation as valid regulation of property. 226 Fiscal efficiency and
administrative convenience impressed the court as sufficient reasons to "compromise . . . the purity of the Cinque Bambini boundary definition. 227 The court
noted that the law would result in the enrichment of some individuals at the expense of others; however, the court believed that Treuting228 allows such a result

217. Secretary of State Brief, supra note 127, at 18 (citing EEOC v. Hernando Bank, Inc., 724 F2d 1188 (5th
Cir. 1984)). See alsoAikerson v. State, 274 So. 2d 124 (Miss. 1973) (if there is ambiguity within a statute its title
may be considered in determining legislative intent).
218. Secretary of State Brief, supra note 127, at 19.
219. Id. (citing EEOC v. Hernando Bank, Inc., 724 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1984)).
220. Id. (citing EEOC v. Hernando Bank, Inc., 724 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1984)).
221. Secretary of State Brief, supra note 127, at 19-20 (citing L.H. Conard Furniture v. Mississippi State Tax
Comm'n, 160 Miss. 185, 133 So. 652 (1931) and Grant's Center Hosp. of Mississippi v. Health Group of Jackson, Mississippi, 528 So. 2d 804, 810 (Miss. 1988) (the agency that works with a particular body of law "necessarily develops a level of insight and expertise likely beyond our ken. When such agencies speak, courts
listen.")).
222. Secretary of State Brief, supra note 127, at 20.
223. Id.
224. Byrd v. State, No. 17,879, slip op. (Ch. Ct. of Harrison County, Miss. Apr. 18, 1990).
225. The opinion was rendered on April 18, 1990, three days after Easter Sunday. Byrd v. Mississippi, No.
17,789, slip op. (Ch. Ct. of Harrison County, Miss. Apr. 18, 1990).
226. Id. at 9- 10.
227. Id. at 9.
228. 199 So. 2d 627 (Miss. 1967). The court cited Moore v. Kuljis, 207 So. 2d 604 (Miss. 1967), as further
support. Byrd v. Mississippi, No. 17,789, slip op. at 10 (Ch. Ct. of Harrison County, Miss. Apr. 18, 1990).
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when it is incidental to the government's acting in the public interest.229 Furthermore, reasoned the court, the statute permits the Secretary of State, in his discretion, to revise the preliminary map when he determines the final boundary.230
VII.

ANALYSIS

A. ConstitutionalIssue
Unfortunately, the Chancellor's opinion fails to adequately address the important issues raised by the 1989 tidelands legislation. Its failure to squarely face the
critical section 95 constitutional conflict creates a fatal flaw in the opinion, justifying its overruling by the Mississippi Supreme Court. The language of section 95
is clear: The state can never donate directly or indirectly, public lands, including
tidelands, to private interests.2' The word "never" admits to no exceptions, and
case law under section 95 encompasses none. In its most recent opinion construing section 95, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that leasing of sixteenth section trust property 23 2 at a "grossly inadequate price" violates section 95.233 In that
case, the court voided a ninety-nine year lease of sixteenth section lands for a onetime payment of $7.50 for a ninety-nine year term (an amount equal to .375 %of
its leased value) .234 The Legislature's directive in the tidelands legislation is even
will in effect be receiving a gratuimore egregious -certain coastal landowners
235
tous gift of trust land from the state.
In a case dealing specifically with public trust tidelands, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled similarly. 238 Although the federal court's interpretation of Mississippi's Constitution is not binding on Mississippi courts, its analysis is sound
and consistent with section 95 case law in Mississippi. In United States v. Harrison
County,237 the federal appellate court found that section 95 prohibits private upland
owners from gaining title to artificially filled trust tidelands, even when filled by a
stranger to the upland title."' At issue in HarrisonCounty was ownership of public trust tide bottoms filled by the county in order to protect Highway 90 and the

229.Id. at 9-10.
230.Id. at 11.
231. Miss. CONST. art. 4, § 95.
232. Sixteenth section trust property is property held by the state for the benefit of public education. Miss.
CODE ANN. § 29-3-1 (Supp. 1989); Hill v. Thompson, 564 So. 2d 1 (Miss. 1989).
233. Hill v. Thompson, 564 So. 2d I (Miss. 1989).
234. Id. at *28. The state sought return of full title to the State of Mississippi. For equitable considerations, the
court refused to do so; rather it remanded the issue to the Forest Municipal Separate School board to redetermine
the land's rental value. During the appraisal process, the current lessor retained the right to use the premises, as
well as right of first refusal on the new lease and the right to meet the best bid. Id. at *35.
235. The authors recognize that the Supreme Court specifically excluded the 1989 tidelands legislation from
the purview of its Hill v. Thompson opinion. However, that statement was made in the context of a review of
legislation relating to the leasing procedures of public lands. Additionally, because the tidelands legislation was
not at issue before them, there would have been no reason forthem to issue an advisory opinion on applicability
of section 95.
236. United States v. Harrison County, 399 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1968).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 491.
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seawall separating it from the Mississippi Sound.29 The suit was brought by the
United States for specific performance of a contract which "assured perpetual use
of the beach."24 Support for ejecting the public from the beaches came from a
previous Mississippi Supreme Court decision, Harrison County v. Guice,241
awarding upland owners title to trust lands that Harrison County, using federal
funds, had filled by artificial means.242 The Fifth Circuit specifically refused to
follow the Guice holding; it asserted that lack of reference to section 95 by the
court invalidated the Guice opinion as binding precedent.2 "4
Similarly, provisions of the tidelands legislation directing the Secretary of State
to draw the boundary line inconsistent with the CinqueBambini and PhillipsPetroleum Co. decisions would unconstitutionally grant private persons title to public
trust tidelands. As stated earlier, these cases establish Mississippi's boundary between public and private property in tidal areas as the mean high water mark when
the state entered the Union in 1817.24 Changes in that boundary after 1817 must
be consistent with state constitutional, statutory, and common law.24 As recognized by the Fifth Circuit in HarrisonCounty, section 95 is an unambiguous blanket prohibition against changing that boundary when doing so results in the
donation, either directly or indirectly, of public trust land to private parties.2 "
Therefore, a map or deed depicting boundaries where developments and encroachments prior to July 1, 1973, have altered the high water mark to the benefit
of the private owner would be void.247 Any legislation directing the Secretary of
State to do so is unconstitutional.
The Chancellor's ruling that the Secretary of State can amend the boundary
consistent with the common law fails to remedy the constitutional deficiency.
First, the Legislature cannot pass an unconstitutional law and cure it by inserting a
section that gives the executive branch discretion to comply with or ignore the
constitution.2 "4 As stated by the Mississippi Supreme Court in State ex rel. Kyle v.
Dear:249 "The Constitution is paramount to any authority conferred by a statute

239. Id. at 490.
240. Id. at 486, 490.
241. 244 Miss. 95, 140 So. 2d 838 (1962).
242. 399 F.2d at 490.
243. Id. at 491.
244. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
245. Cinque Bambini, 491 So. 2d at 512-13; PhillipsPetroleum Co., 484 U.S. at 475.
246. 399 F2d at 491.
247. See supra notes 116-40 for a discussion of tidelands development on the Mississippi coast.
248. In Hill v. Thompson, 564 So. 2d 1 (Miss. 1989), the Mississippi Supreme Court rejected the Chancery
Court's finding that the school district had followed existing statutory leasing procedures when it decided the
lease value stating:
He [the superintendent of education] certainly has no authority to enter a long term lease at a nominal one
time rental, so that the lease is tantamount to a gift. This principle has been embodied in this state's constitution which prohibits donation of public land no matter what legislative procedure is mandated. Miss.
CONST. Art. 4, § 95 (1890). This Court knows of no rule of law whereby the substantive prohibition of
Section 95 may be violated if only certain forms or procedures are met.
Id. at9.
249. 209 Miss. 268, 46 So. 2d 100 (1950).
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when the action taken under the statute is in conflict with the Constitution." 250 In
addition, to assert the contrary ignores the fact that legislative and administrative
fiat are insufficient to amend Mississippi's Constitution. Amendment of a constitutional provision must be consistent with article 15, section 273 of the Mississippi Constitution, which details a procedure that was not followed when the
Legislature passed the tidelands legislation. 21' It requires that two-thirds of the
members of each house vote in favor of the amendment, followed by public notice
and public election in which a majority of qualified electors voting must approve
the amendment.25 2 In fact, concurrent efforts to amend the constitution to ameliorate the effect of section 95 on the tidelands legislation failed.253
Second, as correctly stated by the court in HarrisonCounty, section 95 supersedes the common law.254 The Mississippi Supreme Court has recognized this
same principle in regard to sixteenth section trust lands .2" Followed to its logical
extreme, this proposition prevents the Mississippi courts from applying common
law public trust principles to the extent they result in a donation to private parties.
In addition, it invalidates the language of section 29-15-7(2)256 that statutorily

adopts the common law doctrines of accretion and reliction. 257 For example, natural accretions that develop adjacent to the shore inure to the upland owner. To the
extent that such accretions result in the diminution of public trust lands, it can be
argued that an unconstitutional "donation" occurs.
Third, the tidelands legislation does not, as the court suggests, grant the Secretary of State that power. Section 29-15-7(4) of the Mississippi Code states: "The
Secretary of State shall allow sixty (60) days after publication of the preliminary
map for submission of comments and/or additional documentation and may, at his
discretion, revise the map accordingly."22 8 Well-accepted standards of statutory
construction require that words be given their plain meaning; use of the word "accordingly" 25 9 limits the Secretary of State's discretion in adjusting the boundary to
ways that correspond with public comment and documentation, but not to his own

250. Id. at 104.
251. Miss. CONST. art. 15, § 273.

252. Id.
253. S.Con. Res. 521, 104th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1989); S. 2770, 104th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1989).
254. 399 F.2d at 491. "In any event, the constitutional provision [section 95] supersedes and abrogates the
common law." Id. (citation omitted).
255. "At common law no trustee has authority to lease real property held in trust for substantially less than the
fair
value thereof. . . .This principle has been embodied in this state's constitution which prohibits donation of
public land . . . ." Hill v. Thompson, 564 So. 2d 1,9 (Miss. 1989).

256. Miss. CODE § 29-15-7(2) (Supp. 1989).
257. See id.
258. Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-7 (Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
259. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines "accordingly" to mean in accordance with (in agreement with), correspondingly. WEBsTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DicroNARv 50 (9th ed. 1988).
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initiative. The court's partial quote of section 29-25-7(4) omits the language that
results in the conclusion that the Secretary of State's discretion is limited.26
Likewise, the court's attempt to avoid the plain language of section 95 by categorizing the legislation as regulation rather than a donation261 is unpersuasive.
Regulation of the type found in section 29-15-7 of the tidelands legislation clearly
results in the gratuitous transfer of property from the public to private parties. The
Chancellor in effect admits this when he states that "a few may improvidently benefit from the 1989 Tidelands Act."262 The "benefit" he refers to is the private appropriation of public lands with no economic return to the public,2" i.e., a
donation. However, he attempts to circumvent this conclusion by finding that the
overall effect of the legislation is a "long delayed delineation between public and
private interests"264 rather than a donation of public property to private interests.26 Such a change in characterization of the legislation fails to overcome the
underlying result of the legislation - a free grant of public property to private interests in contravention of section 95 of the constitution.
Even if the tidelands legislation could be conceived as regulation rather than a
donation, it must still fail because it divests the public of property without due
process of law.266 Sections 95 and 273 of Mississippi's Constitution read together
lead inevitably to this conclusion. Section 95 serves to constitutionally vest the
public's interest in the state's publicly-owned property, including tidelands.267 The
fifth amendment266 of the United States Constitution and section 14 of the Mississippi Constitution269 prevent the State of Mississippi from depriving its citizens of
this property without due process of law. Because the source of the public's right
is the state constitution, the only process that can lawfully take away this right is
constitutional amendment. And as discussed earlier,27 the State Legislature
failed to follow section 273's mandates when it passed the 1989 Tidelands Legislation. Therefore, absent a duly passed constitutional amendment modifying or repealing section 95, the Legislature is without authority to demand the Secretary of

260. Byrd v. State, No. 17,789, slip op. at 11 (Ch. Ct. of Harrison County, Mississippi Apr. 18, 1990). Defendant State of Mississippi's reasoning on p.9 of its brief that the Secretary of State's office can comment during
the public comment period and then amend the map in accordance with its own comments is an absurd reading of
MISS. CODE § 29-15-7. It is not common practice for agencies to comment on their own rules. Similarly, it is
unlikely the legislature expected the Secretary of State to do so without explicitly stating so.
261. Id. at 5.
262. Id. at 9.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 10.
265. The court's assertion is belied by language in the Cinque Bambini and Phillips Petroleum Co. decisions.
Both courts rejected the plaintiffs' claim that including non-navigable tidelands in the public trust lands would
upset settled property expectations of coastal landowners. To the contrary, the courts found that Mississippi case
law provided adequate notice that private property rights in coastal tideland areas extend to the mean high water
mark only. See Cinque Bambini, 491 So. 2d at 520; PhillipsPetroleum Co., 484 U.S. at 482.
266. See MIss. CONST. art. 3, § 14.
267. MISS. CONST. art. 4, § 95.
268. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
269. Miss. CONST. art. 3, § 14.
270. See supra notes 216-23 and accompanying text.
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State to draw boundaries inconsistent with the Cinque Bambini and PhillipsPetroleum Co. holdings.
B. Common Law Public Trust
Even if the constitutional hurdles could be surmounted or were to be found inapplicable, Mississippi Supreme Court public trust case law requires invalidation
of section 29-15-7.271 The Mississippi Supreme Court has consistently put limits
on the ability of the Legislature to alienate public trust tidelands; public policy and
the state's duty to the public under traditional fiduciary principles militate strongly
in favor of the Court's continuing to follow the approach set forth in Money v.
InternationalPaper Co. of Moss Point v.
Wood, 272 Rouse v. Saucier's Heirs,273 and
274
Mississippi State Highway Department.
In its 1928 Money decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court first announced that
under section 8 1275 of the state constitution, the state, as trustee, could not dispose
of tidelands in a manner inconsistent with the purpose for which the trust exists .276
The court reasoned that section 81 aligned Mississippi with those states that prohibit conveyance in fee of trust lands to private owners for private purposes .277 It
thus invalidated a sale of public tidelands to a private owner for the purpose of
building an artificial island upon which hotels, boulevards, and private residences
would be built. 278 The Byrd facts fit squarely within Money. A car dealership is
clearly a private business that brings a profit to the owner and only minimal benefits to the public, none of which relate to public trust uses.
Although the court in Money specifically declined to rule on whether the common law itself would prevent such a sale,279 the court's next decision five years
later erased any doubt. In Rouse v. Saucier'sHeirs, the court invalidated conveyances of tidelands made by the State Land Commissioner.280 In so doing, it stated
that "[nleither the state nor the federal government can validly convey title in fee
simple to [such] an area . . . to private owners for private purposes."281
After a brief aberration from this position,282 the court returned to its former
stance. In InternationalPaperCo. v. MississippiState Highway Department,283 the
court refused to give legal credence to state patents to marshlands and accreted
lands that had been subject to the ebb and flow of the tide at statehood: "[T]he

§ 29-15-7 (Supp. 1989).
152 Miss. 17, 118 So. 357 (1928).
166 Miss. 704, 146 So. 291 (1933).
271 So. 2d 395 (Miss. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973).
MIss. CONST. art. 4, § 81.
152 Miss. 29-31, 118 So. at 359-60.
Id. at 29, 118 So. at 359.
Id. at 27-32, 118 So. at 358-60.
Id. at 30, 118 So. at 292.
166 Miss. 704,705, 146 So. 291, 292.
166 Miss. at 713, 146 So. at 292.
Treuting v. Bridge & Park Comm'n, 199 So. 2d 627 (Miss. 1967).
271 So. 2d 395 (Miss. 1972).

271. MISS. CODE ANN.

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
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ownership of the state was and is as trustee for the use and benefit of all the people
of the state and it is not subject to conveyances to private individuals for private
purposes."2"4
This position was reiterated as recently as 1986 when, in its Cinque Bambini
decision, the court limited the state's right to alienate publicly owned tidelands to
instances where a "higher public purpose" is served.2"' Realizing this, the legislature provided such a purpose in the tidelands legislation- settling long-held property expectations.2"' However, both the Mississippi and United States Supreme
Courts rejected that same contention in their Cinque Bambini and Phillips Petroleum Co. opinions as a reason for limiting state-owned tidelands to those under
waters that are navigable-in-fact. 7 Such a position holds no more weight in the
context of the 1989 legislation.
The chancery court chose to ignore the Money line of cases, focusing instead on
the aberration, Treuting, which the InternationalPaper court had limited to its
facts.28 Important policy considerations support continued limitation on the
Treuting holding. First, prohibition on alienation reflects the public will as expressed in section 95 which evidences current public sentiment in favor of such a
restriction on alienation. Second, as pointed out by the Secretary of State in his
brief to the chancery court, if the 1989 tidelands legislation is allowed to stand,
private landowners will be unjustly enriched at the expense of the public.28 9 This
resulting inequity not only offends one's sense of justice, but also amounts to an
illegal breach of the state's common law fiduciary duties to the public. The Mississippi Supreme Court recently reaffirmed applicability of the common law of
private trusts to the public school lands trust.29 There the court stated: "At common law, one who holds as trustee is prohibited from giving away, appropriating to
his own use, or otherwise, disposing of the corpus of a trust in derogation of the
rights of the beneficiaries."29 1 The rule for public trust tidelands should be no different. 292 The state holds tidelands in trust for the public, a trust encompassing a

284. Id. at 398.
285. 491 So. 2d 508, 513 (Miss. 1986) (quoting Briefs for Appellees and Cross-Appellant at 8, 16).
286. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text which contradicts the legislature's contention that a title
crisis
exists.
287. See supra notes 5-34 and accompanying text. In addition, as argued earlier, section 95 would prohibit
conveyance, even for a higher public purpose than protecting the tidelands ecosystem, if doing so amounts to a
donation of the public trust property to private interests. See supra notes 203-30 and accompanying text.
288. 271 So. 2d at 398-99.
289. The Secretary of State goes on to assert that the legislation will award those who misappropriated tidelands, as well as "innocent purchasers" because, as recognized by the supreme court in both InternationalPaper
and Cinque Bambini, public trust case law gives sufficient indication of state ownership below the high water
mark. In fact, in InternationalPaper,the fact that property taxes had been paid for years on the public trust portions of the property was insufficient to validate private ownership of those lands. InternationalPaper,271 So.
2d at 399-400.
290. Hill v. Thompson, 564 So. 2d 1,6 (1989).
291. Id. at 6. The Court here recognized that the federal government has applied a similar trust to federal public lands. Id.
292. See CONNORS, LAURENCE, COLUMBIA, ARCHER & BOWEN, THE NATIONAL PUBLIC TRUST STUDY 37-64
(1990) for a detailed discussion of applicability of charitable trust concepts to the tidelands public trust.
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common law fiduciary duty that has, as with the public school lands trust, "been
made more concrete ... by the Mississippi Constitution and ... legislative enactment."293 The question then becomes whether granting a gift of public trust
tidelands to private individuals for private purposes is an action in derogation of
the rights of the beneficiaries. The answer is clearly yes. Private appropriation of
public land, at no cost, that ultimately precludes the public from using the land,
deprives the public of all potential benefits, including economic, aesthetic, recreational, and environmental.
Third, as reflected in the Coastal Wetlands Protection Law, the state's tidelands
represent a valuable resource in need of special protection.294 The state can best
assure this protection by keeping the maximum amount of such lands in public
ownership.295
VIII. CONCLUSION

The Byrd litigation presents the Mississippi Supreme Court with its first opportunity to interpret article 4, section 95 of the Mississippi Constitution in the context of public trust tidelands. The court's decision will have significant political as
well as legal import. Also, it has the potential to dramatically affect the way in
which the state tidelands trust is administered.
Validation of the 1989 tidelands legislation's command to the Secretary of State
to, in the guise of efficiency, legally determine boundaries in a manner inconsistent with the decision of the highest courts in Mississippi and the United States tacitly gives the Legislature the power to circumvent valid pronouncements of the
judiciary when it is politically expedient to do so. In addition, failure to fit provisions of the 1989 tidelands legislation squarely within the confines of section 95's
prohibition on donation of public land creates two types of public lands- public
trust tidelands that can be alienated at no cost to private interests and all other public lands that must be sold or leased at a reasonable price in a manner which benefits the public. It tells the public that their interest in publicly owned tidelands is
less than their interest in all other public lands. Because their interest is less, the
state's fiduciary duties to the public in tidelands is also less.
Finally it renders the Coastal Wetlands Protection Law a much less potent tool
in managing coastal tidal resources in a manner that balances economic development with preservation of wetlands in their natural state. The primary reason for
passage of the Wetlands Law was to ensure that the short-term economic interests
of a few would not supersede the state's interest in protecting valuable coastal resources- hence the law's policy of leaving tidelands in their natural state unless alteration would serve a higher public interest. Declaring the settling of the
economic expectations of private landowners to be a higher public purpose evis-

293. Hill, 564 So. 2d at 7.
294. Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-27-1 (Supp. 1989).
295. See Jarman, Of Tine, Tidelands, and Public Trust, 57 Miss. L.J. 131 (1987). But see Comment, The Mississippi Public Trust Doctrine:Public and PrivateRights in the CoastalZone, 46 Miss. L.J. 84 (1975).
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cerates the law's raison d'etre. It re-balances the scale in favor of private economic
interests over environmental public interests, thus opening the door for a reassertion in other contexts of private over public interests in coastal resource decisionmaking.
Although a number of coastal citizens and companies may experience some degree of economic loss should the Mississippi Supreme Court rule the tidelands legislation unconstitutional, the true extent of that loss is not known.296 However, it is
highly unlikely that the economic and social impact would come near the catastrophic proportions projected in the Legislature's Preamble to the Public Trust
Tidelands Legislation.297 On the other hand, invalidating those portions of the
1989 Tidelands Legislation that are inconsistent with section 95's prohibition on
donating public lands to private persons would send a clear message to the Legislature and the people of Mississippi that the state cannot abrogate its fiduciary duties
in the management of its public lands. It will force the Legislature to confront its
constitutional duties and to alter them only through the appropriate legal process in this case, through constitutional amendment.

296. No formal evidentiary hearings have been held to date to determine the true extent of the potential damage
to the state's economy should tidelands filled prior to 1973 be incorporated within the public trust. See supra
notes 120-34, 138-50 and accompanying text.
297.
[T]his dispute has cast a doubt and cloud over the titles to all littoral lands and all riparian lands along the
rivers and shorelines of the coastal area to such a degree that land sales are being prevented, business and
home purchasing has been made difficult or impossible, industrial financing based on such titles has become unavailable, and homeowners and other owners have been rendered apprehensive as to their security in their ownership. Economic growth and development in the coastal counties is at a virtual
standstill, creating a constantly increasing and incalculable loss of dollars to the area as well as the loss of
countless new jobs for the average citizens of our state.
Act approved Mar. 31, 1989, ch. 495 § 1, 1989 Miss. LAws 355 (Preamble to the Public Trust Tidelands Legislation).

